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Today marks the 56th anniversary of the day Stalin began the deportations of the 
Chechens and several other North Caucasian nations to Central Asia. Among the 
worst crimes of the Stalin era, the deportations were accompanied by massacres 
and repression. Hundreds of thousands died of suffocation, disease, exposure, 
and starvation. Those deemed "untransportable" -- children, the elderly, pregnant 
women -- were massacred on the spot. As a result, the Chechen nation declined 
by 25 percent. The survivors were branded a "punished people." 
 
To this day, not one person has stood trial for those crimes. As we remember the 
victims of Stalinist terror, we sympathize deeply with the victims of Mr. Putin's 
current massacre and doubt whether the international community has any 
intention of bringing him and the others responsible to justice. With that in mind, 
we bring you this article from our colleague, Prof. Walter C. Clemens, Jr. 
 
No Indictment for Moscow War Criminals? 
By Walter C. Clemens, Jr. 
 
Instead of endorsing him prematurely as President Boris Yel'tsin's legitimate 
successor, the international community might ask whether Russia's acting 
president, Vladimir V. Putin, should be indicted for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Putin may be a hero in Russia for his no-holds-barred campaign 
against Chechnya. But on the world stage he should be identified for what he is -- 
a man responsible for offenses against international human rights conventions. 
Perhaps former President Yel'tsin might also be in the dock, but he might be 
excused, for signs of faltering faculty and ill health. Putin, on the other hand, 
enjoys all his faculties and has used them to manage a war against Chechnya 
that deliberately targets civilians for destruction. In fact, in January Putin adopted 
a policy that treats all Chechen males aged 10 to 60 as combatants and orders 
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their arrest. 
 
The United States must use its clout to push for an immediate end to the fighting 
and an investigation into allegations of atrocities against civilians. Those 
responsible for the crimes must be brought to justice. The most serious outrages 
to come to light so far include the following: 
 
• Russian soldiers round up civilians from captured villages and detain them 
with complete disregard for due process in "filtration centers," or 
concentration camps. 
 
• According to former inmates, the civilians held in such camps are routinely 
beaten, tortured, and raped. 
 
• There have been many allegations of executions of Chechen civilians at 
the hands of Russian solders. Human Rights Watch verified 41 such 
cases in just one area of Grozny. 
 
• There have been repeated allegations of the use of chemical weapons, as 
well as confirmed indiscriminate shelling against populated areas, the 
extensive use of mines which will plague civilians for years to come, and 
the employment of devastating weaponry such as fuel-air bombs against 
Grozny. 
 
• Based on their nationality, Chechen civilians are routinely denied the right 
of free passage across what are ostensibly internal borders between 
Chechnya and other Russian regions. 
 
• In contravention of international norms, Russian forces have bombed 
humanitarian aid convoys and humanitarian corridors, the only escape 
routes from the Grozny slaughterhouse. 
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Aside from those crimes perpetrated by specific individuals, there is the general 
public tolerance of this bloodbath. Perhaps most Russian political and military 
leaders, along with most directors of Russian television stations and newspapers, 
should be held responsible, since most have supported Putin's war. But it was 
Putin and a few others at the top who gave the orders for months of 
indiscriminate attacks on Chechen civilians. 
 
Most Russian voters seem to have endorsed Putin and his war. They, like most 
Serbians and Javanese in 1999, have shown how hollow are the claims that 
human rights have now gained universal acceptance. To be sure, most Russians, 
like Serbs and Javanese, have limited access to objective reports on the 
atrocities committed in their behalf. But the racist attitudes of many Russians 
toward dark-skinned persons provide fertile ground for regime propaganda. Like 
Serbs and Javanese, ordinary Russians have been manipulated by media efforts 
to distract them from domestic problems, mobilized instead against external 
scapegoats. 
 
Russia's dissidents have called for immediate cease-fires and negotiations but 
have been ignored by the increasingly timid media in Russia and the morally 
obtuse media of the West. As in the Soviet past, a few brave persons have taken 
a principled stance. Sergei Kovalev, Grigory Yavlinsky, Andrei Piontkovsky, 
Pavel Felgenhauer, and the Soldiers' Mothers Committee have been vocal 
advocates of peace, but their voices fall on deaf ears, not just in Russia but in the 
West. 
 
NATO leaders have eased the job of Russian propagandists. Chorus-like, 
Western politicians have defended Russians' right to fight "terrorism" and 
maintain Russia's "territorial integrity." Contrary to President Bill Clinton's 
assertion, however, Chechnya is not like South Carolina in 1861. Chechens have 
never voluntarily accepted union with Russia -- not in Tsarist, Communist, or 
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post-Communist times. For more than two centuries the rulers of Russia have 
denied Chechens national self-determination. When the last war ended in 1996, 
the ambiguity of Chechnya's status was recognized in the Khasavyurt Treaty, 
which specifies that "The agreement on the fundamentals of relations between 
Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic being determined in accordance 
with generally recognized norms of international law shall be reached prior to 
December 31, 2001." 
 
Why did Russia break this truce? The Kremlin says it invaded again to root out 
terrorism. But this is a handy pretext. As the former prime minister, Sergei 
Stepashin, indicated, the intervention was planned in March, five months prior to 
the bombings in Russian cities. Russia's invasion of Chechnya has been used to 
boost Putin's popularity and ensure an "orderly transfer of power"; to cow 
Russia's southern neighbors, the pro-western Azerbaijan and Georgia; to regain 
Russian control over a key route for Caspian oil; to reaffirm the unbreakable unity 
of an empire now known as the "Russian Federation"; and to settle scores for 
generals humbled by the Chechens back in 1996. 
 
Granted that some dialogue is needed with a nuclear superpower, must the West 
bow and scrape before another Russian leader responsible for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity (not to mention the deaths of ill-trained teenaged 
Russian conscripts)? Is this the time to praise Russia's "democracy" or its 
rebounding stock market? Should the West be providing Russia more credit so it 
can continue to wage this war? If we call a spade a spade, it is not clear why the 
Kremlin's acting president does not belong with the Iraqi, Rwandan, Indonesian, 
and other warlords held responsible for crimes against humanity in recent years. 
The West had to ignore the crimes of Stalin to support him against Hitler. It has 
no such reason to appease the former KGB agent who now speaks of rebuilding 
Russia's greatness. The international community, with the US at the lead, must 
use all the diplomatic and economic pressure at its disposal to make sure that 
the authors of another ghastly massacre, the second in the history of the 
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Chechen nation, do not get away with mass murder. 
 
The author is Professor of Political Science at Boston University and Associate, 
Harvard University Davis Center for Russian Studies. His most recent work, The 
Baltic Miracle: Complexity Theory and European Security, is due to be published 
this year by Rowman and Littlefield. His other works include Dynamics of 
International Relations (Rowman and Littlefield, 1998) and Can Russia Change 
(Routledge, 1990). Readers with comments may contact Prof. Clemens directly, 
at wclemens@bu.edu 
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